20/11/2026
by Professor Alberto Alemanno
For a decade, Brussels’ ethics debate has focused on elected and appointed officials, while the career staff of the EU institutions have largely escaped the same scrutiny. Scandals ranging from José Manuel Barroso’s move to Goldman Sachs to Qatargate prompted a series of reforms: a revised Code of Conduct for Commissioners in 2018, tighter rules for MEPs after Qatargate, and, in 2024, the creation of an interinstitutional Body for Ethical Standards. None, however, extended the new oversight framework to career staff.
The European Parliament had called for staff to be covered by the new body. The Commission resisted, arguing that the Staff Regulations already ensure ‘identical standards and rules for the entire civil service of the EU’ (COM(2023) 311). The Interinstitutional Agreement of 15 May 2024 consequently confined the Body’s remit to members of the institutions. The Commission’s latest report on the implementation of the Staff Regulations confirms that the legislative framework has remained unchanged since the 2014 reform and identifies no ethics rules adopted by common agreement between the institutions (COM(2026) 474).
The Commission’s approach finds some support in the European Court of Auditors’ Special Report 13/2019, which concluded that the audited institutions had ‘to a large extent’, established adequate ethical frameworks, supported by investigative and sanction mechanisms. But the audit examined the rules and procedures in place, not their implementation. It also identified weaknesses in the guidance and verification procedures on which those frameworks depend. Its findings therefore offer limited reassurance about how effectively the rules operate in practice. Subsequent cases have brought those shortcomings into sharper focus. Indeed, over the past years, multiple cases of unethical behaviour in the EU institutions have revealed significant systemic shortcomings, notably in the framework’s current implementation. The revolving door cases of staff members such as Reinald Krueger, Adam Farkas and Aura Salla are a star reminder that the current EU ethics oversight system falls short of reducing the risk of unethical behaviour to a minimum. The same audit found that almost 70% of staff had little or no knowledge of how to report unethical conduct, and only around a third believed that those who report are protected.
This contribution argues that while the EU staff ethics regime is comprehensive on paper, its application remains largely in the hands of the employing institution, which is subject to limited independent scrutiny. This oversight deficit is particularly acute when officials take leave on personal grounds to work for private employers whose interests are connected to their former responsibilities.
The Staff Regulations establish obligations that follow officials throughout their careers. Before recruitment, the appointing authority must examine whether candidates have personal interests that could impair their independence or create conflicts of interest (Article 11). During service, officials must act solely in the interests of the Union, inform the appointing authority of any personal interest that could impair their independence, and comply with any measures taken to address it (Article 11a). They must also obtain permission for outside occupational activities (Article 12b). During leave on personal grounds, Article 12b continues to apply. In particular, permission cannot be granted for an activity involving lobbying or advocacy vis-à-vis the official’s institution if it could create a conflict with its legitimate interests (Article 40(1a)). On return, the conflict-of-interest check under Article 11 applies by analogy. After leaving the service, officials must notify their institution of any occupational activity they intend to undertake within two years, which the appointing authority may prohibit or approve subject to conditions. Former senior officials are, in principle, prohibited for twelve months from lobbying or advocating vis-à-vis staff of their former institution on matters for which they were responsible during their final three years in service (Article 16). The duty not to disclose information received in the line of duty without authorisation also continues after departure (Article 17).
The application of these rules belongs to the appointing authority of each institution. There is no single EU authority for staff ethics. Each institution decides on permissions under Articles 12b, 16 and 40, opens administrative inquiries (Article 86 and Annex IX), and imposes disciplinary penalties after consulting its own Disciplinary Board (Annex IX, Article 5). Within the Commission these tasks are centralised. Decisions on outside and post-service activities are prepared by DG HR, while the Investigation and Disciplinary Office (IDOC) conducts inquiries and disciplinary proceedings, also for the EEAS and the executive agencies under service-level agreements. Article 2(2) of the Staff Regulations would allow the institutions to entrust such powers to an interinstitutional body, as they did for selection with EPSO. They have not done so for ethics. Nor does OLAF provide a general mechanism for overseeing staff ethics. Its internal investigative mandate concerns fraud, corruption and other illegal activities affecting the Union’s financial interests, including serious breaches of professional duties liable to lead to disciplinary or criminal proceedings. It cannot therefore substitute for independent scrutiny of the legality or appropriateness of staff ethics authorisations.
How such administrative discretion is used is shown by the European Ombudsman’s 2021 own-initiative inquiry (OI/1/2021/KR). The Ombudsman examined 100 Commission decisions taken between 2019 and 2021 concerning requests to take up occupational activities after leaving the service or during leave on personal grounds. In the sample of 100 decisions examined, only two requests were prohibited; the others were authorised, often subject to conditions.
Yet once it is granted, an authorisation is in practice beyond judicial review. Only the official concerned may challenge a staff decision under Articles 90 and 91 of the Staff Regulations, and he or she has no interest in contesting a permission. Third parties, such as NGOs and journalists, will generally struggle to establish the direct and individual concern required to challenge an individual staff decision. In practice, external scrutiny therefore relies heavily on complaints to the European Ombudsman, whose recommendations are not binding, and requests for access to documents. The latter can expose the authorisation to public scrutiny but cannot annul or otherwise overturn it.
The greatest weakness in the system concerns officials who take leave on personal grounds.
During such a leave, the official remains in the service of the institution but may take up employment outside it. Article 40(1a) provides that the rules on outside activities under Article 12b continue to apply. Permission cannot be granted for activities involving lobbying or advocacy vis-à-vis the official’s institution where these could conflict with its legitimate interests. But this is not a general prohibition on working for a private employer, even one whose interests are closely connected to the official’s former responsibilities. Nor does Article 16’s post-employment regime apply in the same way, since the official has not left the service. The result is a significant gap: an official may work for an organisation with a direct interest in their former regulatory responsibilities while retaining the right to return, subject to conditions imposed by the very institution whose interests are at stake. The case of Reinald Krueger illustrates the point. As head of the unit responsible for regulatory coordination and telecom markets in DG CONNECT, he obtained unpaid leave on personal grounds in 2018. He was authorised to become Group Public Policy Development Director at Vodafone, a company directly affected by the rules his unit had administered. The Commission subjected the decision to conditions: no lobbying or advocacy vis-à-vis Commission staff, no handling with files linked to his former work, and no professional contact with his former DG for a year. The authorisation was renewed in 2019. Netzpolitik.org later documented his encounters with former colleagues at events, which the Commission did not consider to constitute lobbying. The Ombudsman subsequently found maladministration in the Commission’s refusal to disclose the related documents without redacting Krueger’s name. But the substantive decision to authorise his move was never subjected to judicial review.
The case is not isolated. According to Commission figures obtained by Corporate Europe Observatory, in 2019 the Commission approved 594 requests for outside activities during leave on personal grounds and rejected three.
The post-employment cases show the same pattern. Adam Farkas, Executive Director of the European Banking Authority, was authorised in 2019, subject to restrictions, to become chief executive of the Association for Financial Markets in Europe. The Ombudsman held that the move should have been forbidden, that the restrictions could not be effectively monitored, and that he had kept access to confidential information after the EBA learned of his move (2168/2019/KR). The Farkas case demonstrates that the problem is not simply one of insufficiently strict rules. It is also a question of whether the institution applying those rules can credibly assess and monitor the risks created by the move.
Aura Salla, formerly a member of Vice-President Katainen’s cabinet and later at the Commission’s in-house think tank, was authorised in May 2020 to head Facebook’s EU affairs. The conditions were a six-month ban on professional contact with her former service and a one-year ban on lobbying the Commission on matters from her last three years. In each case the institution identified the risk and approved the move, relying on conditions whose respect depends largely on the good faith of the person concerned.
To reduce the risk of unethical behaviour to a minimum, one can think of three reforms, none of which entails Treaty reform.
First, the institutions should establish a common, independent mechanism for assessing high-risk staff ethics decisions. Article 2(2) of the Staff Regulations provides a possible legal basis for entrusting appointing-authority powers to an interinstitutional body. Alternatively, the remit of the existing Body for Ethical Standards could be extended, subject to the necessary changes to its mandate and procedures.
Second, leave on personal grounds taken to pursue employment with an entity whose interests are directly connected to the official’s former responsibilities should trigger an Article 16-type assessment. Where the risks cannot be adequately mitigated, the activity should be prohibited. Where it is authorised, restrictions should apply both during the leave and upon return, including a cooling-off period from the relevant files. In any event the decision should be published.
Third, and last, as the Ombudsman suggested, the respect of conditions accompanying the authorisations should be verified and decisions published promptly.
The independence of the European civil service is essential to its legitimacy. The Staff Regulations establish safeguards to protect it. But safeguards are only as effective as their enforcement. When the institution that grants an ethics authorisation is also responsible for assessing its adequacy and monitoring compliance, independence ultimately rests on the institution’s own judgment. That is not enough. The EU needs staff ethics oversight that is independent, transparent and capable of holding its institutions to account.
This article appeared in EU Law Live on November 19 2026.