A new investigation by Reclaim Finance offers one of the most detailed snapshots to date of lobbying activity inside the European Parliament. Over just 16 weeks in late 2025, lobbyists entered Parliament 22,158 times, representing 2,553 different organisations. This is not simply a story of high numbers; it is a story about who shows up, when they show up, and how influence is exercised.
One of the report’s most important contributions is shifting attention beyond formal meetings. While official encounters between lobbyists and policymakers are declared, the data reveals a parallel, less visible reality: informal lobbying in corridors, cafés, and unrecorded encounters. Crucially, over 60% of fossil fuel lobby visits were not linked to any declared meeting. This suggests that much of the influence exercised in Brussels happens outside formal transparency mechanisms, raising questions about how accountability can be ensured.
A Structural Imbalance in Representation
The data confirms a structural imbalance. Private interests account for 59% of all lobbying visits, while NGOs represent just 28%. But even this comparison understates the disparity. Large corporations operate through multiple channels simultaneously:
- direct representation,
- industry associations, and
- professional consultancies.
For example, ExxonMobil not only lobbies directly but also funds a network of consultancies and associations. When these indirect channels are included, the company’s presence in Parliament exceeds 650 visits in four months. This “multi-layered lobbying” model gives corporate actors a reach that civil society simply cannot match.
The Weight of Fossil Fuel Interests
The report identifies 27 fossil fuel lobbying groups active during the period, including companies, trade associations, and infrastructure firms. Together, they ensured that fossil fuel interests were present in Parliament on 87.5% of sitting days. Their objective was to shape key legislative files, particularly Omnibus I, which revised major sustainability laws such as the Corporate Sustainability Due Diligence Directive (CSDDD) and the Corporate Sustainability Reporting Directive (CSRD).
On certain days, there were more lobbyists than Members of the European Parliament, highlighting how lobbying pressure concentrates precisely when political decisions are being made.
International and Indirect Influence
Another striking finding is the role of non-European actors. The United States was the most active non-EU country, with lobbyists present 95% of the time Parliament was in session. This influence is amplified by consultancies: among the 50 most active firms, 40 were funded by US-based interests. These intermediaries play a central role in shaping EU policy debates, often on behalf of fossil fuel and tech corporations.
Legislative Outcomes and Democratic Risks
The report links this intense lobbying activity to concrete political outcomes. During negotiations on the Omnibus law, key provisions, such as requirements for corporate climate transition plans, were ultimately removed, aligning with demands long advanced by fossil fuel interests. While causality in policymaking is always complex, the correlation between peak lobbying presence and critical legislative turning points is striking.
Transparency efforts by the European Parliament are a step forward, but this report makes clear they are not sufficient. When lobbying is continuous,multi-channel, and largely informal, simply tracking meetings cannot capture the full picture.